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Over the last eight years, discussions about the UK’s national interest
have set the goal of building a ‘resilient nation’ (Omand 2005). The idea
of ‘resilience’ has, or seems to have, superseded ‘security’ as a primary
way of defining the UK’s national interest. Resilience was thus at the
heart of the Conservative Party platform in 2010 (‘A resilient nation’)
and remained at the core of the two key strategic documents published
in 2010: the National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office 2010a) and the
Strategic Defence and Security Review (Cabinet Office 2010b). In each,
resilience appears as one of the two overarching goals that the UK has
set as its national interest. In their foreword to the National Security
Strategy, David Cameron and Nick Clegg thus state: ‘at home, we must
become more resilient both to external threats and to natural disasters’
(Cabinet Office 2010a, p. 4).
The requirements of resilience arguably differ fundamentally from
those of security in terms of both the scope and the timing of action
when confronted with the prospect of disaster. While security is under-
stood as protection and implies preventive action aiming at avoiding
disaster, resilience assumes and accepts that its referent object is vulner-
able and will face disaster sooner or later. The goal is not to prevent
disaster from happening, or even necessarily to delay it, but rather
to limit the damage and facilitate recovery. So a re-framing of the
UK’s national interest from the logic of security-seeking to that of
resilience-seeking suggests a major change that will be assessed in this
chapter.
Is there actually a shift from security to resilience in the understand-
ing of the UK national interest? This question matters for a variety
of reasons, including that the ability to produce national resilience is
not, its supporters notwithstanding, unproblematically a ‘public good’
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(Omand 2005, p. 14). The acceptance of resilience as a public good
depends on two factors:
• the consistency between the discourse of resilience and the actual
policy put in place in the name of the national interest;
• the acceptance by the public of exposure to danger and its
justifications.1
As we will show, some recent academic analysis assumes that the turn
from security to resilience is actually occurring, but that analysis tends
to neglect the fact that the two concepts can actually be articulated
in multiple ways rather than being strictly opposed. They can be pur-
sued simultaneously, resilience appearing as the goal of plan B when the
efforts to keep the nation secure have failed; resilience can appear as a
condition for security, in which case security follows from the recog-
nition of the resilient character of a given community; and finally,
resilience can be one among many ways to mitigate risk. Clarifying
which one of these relationships is used in the framing of the UK’s
national interest in terms of resilience is key to assessing the scope of
the shift from security to resilience.
The debate over the renewal of Trident offers a good case study to
assess this shift for three reasons. First, Trident, as the only pillar of the
UK nuclear deterrence strategy, has so far been portrayed by the gov-
ernment as a core instrument serving the UK’s national interest. The
2013 Trident Alternatives Review states explicitly that ‘nuclear deterrence
has a unique role in deterring extreme threats to the UK’s vital interests
which cannot be countered by other means’ and ‘any change to the UK’s
nuclear deterrent system and/or its posture may have the potential to
impact . . .our . . .national interests’ (UK Cabinet Office 2013b, pp. 3, 9,
13). Second, the debate concerns one of the most important areas of pos-
sible change in the UK’s strategy to promote its national interests. Third,
the discourse of resilience, which was absent from the 2006 Defence
White Paper (UK MoD 2006) and not associated with Trident in the
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and National Security Strat-
egy, has arrived in discussions about Trident in the Trident Alternatives
Review published in July 2013 (UK Cabinet Office 2013b).
Nonetheless, we argue that the debate and policy decisions related
to UK nuclear weapons demonstrate that the shift from security
to resilience is more rhetorical than real both because the fram-
ing of Trident is not in fact fully compatible with the requirements
of resilience and because other possible systems which could meet
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resiliency requirements are neither contemplated nor prioritised. These
findings matter for both theory and policy. If we are right, the scholarly
worry about a shift from security to resilience does not apply to nuclear
weapons policy in the UK. As a consequence, given the destructiveness
attached to those weapons and their expected role in the national secu-
rity architecture, talking about a radical shift from security to resilience
in the framing of UK security and nuclear interests is not convincing.
In the UK’s current strategic planning and understanding of its national
interest, the notion of resilience only suggests that there is a plan B in
case of a failure of standard security policy, and both are pursued in
parallel. In policy terms, we show that the disconnect between the prin-
ciples of resilience and the practices of nuclear weapons policy suggests
that UK policy elites have still not publicly recognised all the risks of
major accidents and other mishaps involving nuclear weapons.
To show this, we start by documenting the rise of resilience in the
discourse about UK national interests and reflect upon its possible artic-
ulations with the concept and goal of security. Our aim is to make sense
of what a shift from security to resilience would entail. We then assess
the practices of UK nuclear weapons policy, and Trident in particular,
in relation to the requirements with which a resilient nuclear weapons
policy would need to comply. We conclude by arguing that the current
understanding of the requirements of deterrence as a communicative
practice both limits the opportunities for conceptual innovation in
nuclear thinking and in large part explains the missed opportunity
regarding the acknowledgement of the risk of a nuclear accident and the
possibility of a consistent shift towards resilience as a national priority.
Redefining UK national interests: From security to resilience?
National interests, whether the UK’s or others’, are socially constructed.
That is,
national interests are social constructions created as meaningful
objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings
with which the world, particularly the international system and the
place of the state in it, is understood. More specifically, national inter-
ests emerge out of the representations – or, to use more customary
terminology, out of situation descriptions and problem definitions –
through which state officials and others make sense of the world
around them.
(Weldes 1996, p. 280)
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In recent years, various academic and policy literatures have argued
that we live in a ‘risk society’ (for example Beck 1992, 1990) and that
we therefore have moved, or should move, from constructing UK (and
other) national interests in terms of a ‘security’ discourse – which focuses
on (putatively) objective threats, protection, defence, prevention and/or
deterrence – to constructing those interests in terms of a discourse of
‘risk’ and ‘resilience’.
Indeed, prominent academics and public intellectuals talk/write as if
they assume that a turn to resilience is in fact occurring. As a result,
many debates have focused on the effects of such a shift from secu-
rity to resilience. Responses have been twofold. On the one hand, some
scholars have made this shift something to be opposed because moving
from security to resilience exposes lives to vulnerability instead of try-
ing to protect them. In other words, resilience would do, or already does,
away with security.2 On the other hand, security experts and some pub-
lic intellectuals have embraced resilience and have advocated the shift
from security to resilience (for example, Taleb 2012). In either case, the
debate takes the shift from security – and threats, protection, defence,
prevention and/or deterrence – to resilience for granted, focusing on
whether it should be embraced or resisted, based on a discussion of its
effects.
This focus on resilience emerges out of the prominence of concerns
over risk and uncertainty. It is the ‘obsession with risk’ (Krahmann 2011,
p. 354) and uncertainty in the discourse of ‘risk society’ that demands we
be, or become, resilient. In contrast to what Cameron and Clegg called
‘the brutal certainties of the Cold War – with an existential danger that
was clear and present’ we are now represented as being ‘in an age of
uncertainty, we are continually facing new and unforeseen threats to
our security’ (2010, pp. 3–4). In this discourse of ‘risk society’, the UK
must shift its focus from manifest threats to possible risks and, more
concretely, to risk assessment, which opens space for framing the UK
national interest in terms of resilience (Edmunds 2012; Hammerstad and
Boas 2012; Ritchie 2011).
Identifying and prioritising risks requires technologies of risk assess-
ment. Risk can, in this sense, be understood as ‘a measure of the level
of insecurity calculated by the probability of a hazard multiplied by
its impact’ (Krahmann 2011, pp. 354–355). The UK National Security
Strategy concurs (Figure 9.1): assessing risk, it asserts,
involves making judgements about the relative impact and likelihood
of each risk in comparison with others . . .This methodology involves
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consideration of the impact of an event (based on economic conse-
quences, casualties and social/structural factors); and the likelihood
of this event occurring over a determined timeframe.
(UK Cabinet Office 2010a, p. 37)
Based on this logic, the UK National Security Strategy announced
that ‘we have conducted the first ever National Security Risk Assess-
ment (NSRA) to assess and prioritise all major areas of national security
risk – domestic and overseas’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010a, p. 25).3 The
NSRA ‘compare[d], assess[ed], and prioritise[d] all major disruptive risks’
to UK national security over the 20 years to come. Specific risks were
allocated to three ‘tiers’, with ‘hostile attacks on UK cyber space’, an
‘international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK’, ‘inter-
national terrorism’ and ‘a major accident or natural hazard which
requires a national response’ comprising the highest-priority Tier 1 risks
(UK Government 2010e). A possible nuclear attack – the risk whose
realisation Trident is designed to deter – is the first risk mentioned in
Tier 2.
The demand for resilience follows directly from this discourse
of uncertainties and risk, and especially from technologies of risk
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Figure 9.1 From ‘Fact sheet 2: National security risk assessment’ (UK Cabinet
Office 2010e) (see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/Factsheet2-
National-Security-Risk-Assessments.pdf)
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assessment. Because there is no such thing as zero risk (as opposed to
the absence of a specific threat) and because the ‘potential range of
imaginable risks is infinite’ (Krahmann 2011, p. 356), risk can only ever
be managed and/or mitigated. As one former senior UK civil servant
put it, ‘we must continue to be honest about risk management – not
risk elimination . . . [We must] not be under the illusion that the risks
can be eliminated at any acceptable cost’ (Omand 2005, p. 17). The UK
National Security Strategy therefore insists that ‘To ensure that we are
able to recover quickly when risks turn into actual damage to our inter-
ests, we have to promote resilience, both locally and nationally’ (UK Cabinet
Office 2010a, emphasis added).
Resilience offers a ‘science of complex adaptive systems and an oper-
ational strategy of risk management’ (Walker and Cooper 2011, p. 143).
Resilience requires that states prepare for when security policies – that
is, protection, defence, prevention and deterrence – or major infrastruc-
tural systems – for example, critical infrastructure like electricity grids
and cyberspace – fail, perhaps catastrophically (an example might be
the spectacular failure of the nuclear power plant at Fukushima Daiichi
in 2011). ‘National resilience’ is therefore ‘the ability to resist, absorb,
recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in condi-
tions’ (US Department of Homeland Security 2009, p. 111). It entails
building the capacity ‘to deal with the consequences that are common
to most types of emergency, regardless of whether those emergencies are
caused by accidents, natural hazards or man-made threats’ (UK Cabinet
Office 2013a). The requirement of resilience thus assumes vulnerability
and emphasises, correspondingly, the survivability of people and infras-
tructure, and the mitigation of and recovery from the consequences of
the realisation of risk.
At the very least, achieving national resilience requires creating
resilient institutions and infrastructure, and a resilient population (Ellis
2010, p. 380). As Cameron and Clegg argued, ‘in an age of uncertainty
the unexpected will happen, and we must be prepared to react to that
by making our institutions and infrastructure as resilient as we possibly
can’ (2010, p. 5). As a result, one of the major national security tasks
identified by the Strategic Defence and Security Review was to ‘[p]rovide
resilience for the UK’ by providing the ‘security and resilience of the
infrastructure most critical to keeping the country running (including
nuclear facilities) against attack, damage or destruction’ (UK Cabinet
Office 2010b, p. 12).
Resilient populations are also extremely important. According to
Omand, resilient populations are those that understand:
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• the full range of risks facing the nation;
• the ‘type of protection and preparation that is considered necessary
and proportionate’;
• that there are ‘limitations’ in public security; and
• that individuals and communities all have a role to play (2005, p. 17).
As the National Security Strategy put it: ‘Ensuring that the public is fully
informed of the risks we face is a critical part of this approach’ (Cabinet
Office 2010a, p. 25). In short, the UK national interest requires a resilient
UK population that:
• would accept their vulnerability to the full scope of risks, including
nuclear risks, and the inability of the state to provide security; and
• would contribute to the mitigation and survivability in the case of
realised risks.
Security and/or resilience?
Interestingly, despite quite vociferous arguments defending the claim of
a shift in UK (and other) national interests from security to resilience,
it is not clear in this discourse – and particularly in the policy doc-
uments we examined – what the relationship between ‘security’ and
‘resilience’ actually is. This relationship remains ambiguous and ill-
defined, leaving open various potential renderings of the exact relations
between these concepts. Are they contradictory, complementary or
something else?
As indicated in our discussion of resilience discourse, the academic
argument that a shift has occurred from security to resilience sug-
gests that the UK national interest is or should be seeking resilience
rather than seeking security. On this interpretation, resilience straight-
forwardly replaces security as the objective of national strategy and the
core national interest. In the UK strategic documents we have examined,
however, the UK seeks to be both ‘secure and resilient’. This orientation
is confirmed in the core of the National Security Strategy, which says
that ‘We must be a nation that is able to bring together all the instru-
ments of national power to build a secure and resilient UK’ (UK Cabinet
Office 2010a, p. 10). The Strategic Defence and Security Review simi-
larly sets resilience as the first of two key goals: ‘(i) to ensure a secure
and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, ter-
ritory and ways of life from all major risks that can affect us directly’
(Cabinet Office 2010b, p. 9).
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In this second case, resilience is added to security as a second core
national interest. The addition of resilience is necessary, as argued above,
because of uncertainty and the unavoidability of risk. In this discourse,
the UK national interest in security takes precedence, but resilience kicks
in as plan B when security has failed, which it is sure to do at some
point given that risks can never be reduced to zero. As the UK National
Security Strategy made clear, ‘whilst we will focus on early identification
and mitigation of risks, we recognise that we cannot expect to eliminate
risks altogether’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010a, p. 22).
Third, resilience can be interpreted as part of being secure, as when
it is claimed that ‘we cannot prevent every risk as they are inherently
unpredictable. To ensure we are able to recover quickly when risks turn
into actual damage to our interests, we have to promote resilience,
both locally and nationally’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010a, p. 25). Here, the
relationship involves the claim that we are more secure if we are also
resilient. In this sense, the one objective, security, presupposes achiev-
ing the other, resilience. As Sir David Omand has argued in defence of
resilience, ‘We must work smarter: think strategically, prepare for the
worst, ruthlessly target resources at risks [sic] and work with allies and
partners to anticipate and prevent threats before they become real. This
preparation is in itself a form of dissuasion as well as of defense’ (2010,
p. 13, emphasis added). That is, it is a prerequisite for security.
Finally, a fourth relationship is also possible: resilience can be viewed
as one of a variety of means to mitigate risk, which, in turn, is as
close to security as we can get in a ‘risk society’. According to Omand,
‘having a resilience capability framework’ is a methodology for ‘risk
reduction’ (2004). Elke Krahmann argues similarly that risk can be mit-
igated through a variety of strategies: prevention, pre-emption, avoid-
ance, deterrence, protection and, finally, resilience (2011, pp. 369–370).
On this interpretation, resilience is a much smaller part of a wider
discourse of uncertainty and risk, which, as noted above, has (suppos-
edly) replaced security as the national interest. This view resembles the
UK National Security Strategy claim that ‘providing resilience’ is one
of its eight ‘national security tasks’: ‘Providing resilience for the UK
by being prepared for all kinds of emergencies, able to recover from
shocks and to maintain essential services’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010a,
p. 33).
Despite a widespread academic and policy discourse of ‘resilience’,
then, its conceptual relationship to security remains unclear. So, in order
to assess the assumed shift from security to resilience in the definition
of the UK’s national interest, we turn to a focused analysis of nuclear
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weapons policy and Trident, which has so far been portrayed by the
government as a core instrument serving the UK’s ‘vital interest’.
UK nuclear policy versus the goal of resilience
What would a resilient nuclear weapons policy look like? Is it consistent
with the way UK elites frame both resilience and the role of Trident?
The prime minister and deputy prime minister have repeatedly invoked
the metaphor of the ‘ultimate insurance policy’ (Cameron and Clegg
2010, p. 5)4 to describe their understanding of the role that UK nuclear
weapons are and should be playing in the national security architecture
and the promotion of the national interest. The notion of an insurance
policy fits with the framework of resilience in several fundamental ways:
the two notions are opposed to prevention, they recognise vulnerability,
and they focus on ex post facto damage limitation. And, as we noted in
the introduction, at least since 2013, Trident itself has been framed in
terms of resilience.
Beyond those rhetorical tropes, the above analysis suggests that a
resilient nuclear weapons policy should be based on two principles:
• it should start by recognising the full scope of nuclear risks; and
• it should aim for maximum survivability.
The first principle requires further elaboration. The full scope of nuclear
risks includes the risk of accidents, possibly resulting in the launch of
a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. In this context we can distinguish
between technological accidents and accidents resulting from misper-
ception. The first would be in line with the widely shared intuition that
there is no such thing as a fail-safe (that is, risk-free) technology and
that technological failure does not always result in a desirable outcome
like the prevention of unintended nuclear use (Pelopidas 2013b). In the
case of nuclear weapons, once the complex and tightly coupled nature
of these systems is recognised, as well as the limit of the imagination of
the engineers performing the reliability tests,5 the causal chain leading
to accidents becomes clear. As Charles Perrow writes,
Since nothing is perfect . . . there will be failures. If the complex inter-
actions defeat designed-in safety devices or go around them, there
will be failures that are unexpected and incomprehensible. If the
system is also tightly coupled, leaving little time for recovery from
failure, little slack in resources or fortuitous safety devices, then the
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failure cannot be limited to parts or units, but will bring down
subsystems or systems. These accidents then are caused initially by
components’ failure, but become accidents rather than incidents
because of the nature of the system itself; they . . . are inevitable . . . for
those systems.
(1999, p. 330; See also Sagan 1993)
One might think that adding redundancy to the system would solve the
problem of tight coupling. There are two issues with this line of reason-
ing, however. While redundancy would definitely address the problem
of tight coupling, it would not entirely solve it, and it would address
that problem by worsening the other feature of the system which makes
it prone to accidents, that is, its complexity (Sagan 2004). It is true that
the scenario in which a missile does not go off when it should because
of a similar cascade of failures would also qualify as a normal or systemic
accident. And in that case, one might argue that no casualties will fol-
low. Several accidents involving British nuclear weapons between 1960
and 1991 described in the July 1992 report by Sir Ronald Oxburgh, the
chief scientific adviser at the Ministry of Defence, fall in the category
of failures without risk of nuclear explosion (Oxburgh 1992; Schlosser
2013a, 2013b). Even so, the possibility of such an accident should be
taken seriously, if the focus on resilience is to be consistent, since an
adversary might detect early signs of preparation for a launch and might
react to them even if the launch ultimately failed.
Nuclear weapons could also be used as a result of misperceptions. If
an enemy launch is detected and the object flies towards one’s country,
there is a non-zero chance that the response will be nuclear retaliation.
As examples indicate – most famously during the NATO Able Archer 83
exercise in 1983 and in 1995 when Russian air defence mistook a mete-
orological satellite launched from Norway for a submarine-launched
ballistic missile from the US (Pry 1999) – mischaracterisation of fly-
ing objects can and does happen, and the speed of ballistic missiles
limits leaders’ ability to realise that a mistake has been made (Podvig
2013). From a UK perspective, such a systemic accident or mispercep-
tion would lead to a nuclear explosion on its soil if it happened in any
nuclear-weapon states whose missiles target the UK. Given that, so far,
no protection against a nuclear attack exists (see Pelopidas 2013a), the
issue of unauthorised launch is not only a problem of the reliability of
the national arsenal. If the accidental launch originated in the UK, it
would become a problem only if the enemy identified it correctly as
coming from there and decided to retaliate.6 In a nutshell, the prospect
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for normal or epistemic accidents, in the UK or in any nuclear-armed
state targeting it, as well as the prospect for misperceptions, keeps the
likelihood of a nuclear explosion in the UK above zero even if one
believes that nuclear deterrence works perfectly.
Recognising this vulnerability should be a pillar of a resilient nuclear
weapons policy. The second principle, if understood in relation to the
goal of building a resilient nation, leads to attaching survivability and
the efforts to maximise it to the population itself – or parts of it – rather
than only to the warheads as does classical deterrence theory (Cohn
1987). As a consequence, a nuclear weapons policy aiming at resilience
should design an infrastructure aiming for maximum survivability and
justify its construction in those terms.
Let us now confront those criteria – the recognition of the full scope
of nuclear risks and the goal of maximum survivability – with the actual
framing of UK nuclear weapons policy. First, the probability of acciden-
tal or erroneous launch based on a misperception in the UK or towards
it is not acknowledged either in the 2010 strategic documents or in the
2013 Trident Alternatives Review.7 Only two scenarios possibly involving
nuclear use are considered: nuclear terrorism, and an unspecified ‘uncer-
tainty’ against which the existence of British nuclear weapons work as
the ‘ultimate insurance policy’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010b, p. 5). In both
cases, malicious intent is clearly assumed. In the first case, it is the inten-
tional use of a nuclear device by a terrorist group. Thus, the Strategic
Defence and Security Review claims that ‘there is a risk that some coun-
tries might in future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism’ (UK Cabinet
Office 2010b, p. 37). Similarly, it is asserted that some actors might seize
‘fissile material’ to build a nuclear device or, possibly, a radiological dis-
persal device with a view to ‘malicious use’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010b,
p. 55, emphasis added). In the second case, the notion of threat, with
its underlying intentionality, reappears in spite of the general shift from
threat to risks discussed above. In the Strategic Defence and Security
Review, one reads that ‘We must not allow states [seeking to support
nuclear terrorism] to threaten our national security or to deter us and
the international community from taking the action required to main-
tain regional and global security’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010b, p. 37). So,
contrary to the requisites of resilience, the UK nuclear policy as stated
in the two 2010 documents as well as the more recent Trident Alterna-
tives Review fails to recognise all the risks related to nuclear weapons in
practice.
Second, a resilient nuclear weapons policy ought to aim at survivabil-
ity. If this aim goes beyond the mere survivability of the warheads and
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relates to the survivability of the ‘resilient nation’, one would expect
to see expenditures and public policies justified in the name of sur-
vivability. Historically, two types of programmes have been developed
to achieve this goal: civil defence programmes, that is, underground
shelters, and anti-missile defences. One could also imagine other types
of shelters, either under water or in space. However, the inefficacy of
the civil defence programmes has been well-established (Garrison 2006;
Clarke 1999, pp. 30–40) and none of those programmes is currently
being considered. To the best of our knowledge, there are also no plans
for under water or space shelters.
However, regardingmissile defence, the Strategic Defence and Security
Review states that the UK ‘will . . .maintain [its] existing policy of close
cooperation with the US and our other NATO allies on ballistic missile
defences, and [it intends] to support proposals to expand NATO’s role’
(UK Cabinet Office 2010b, p. 28) because ‘[the UK’s] strong defence,
security and intelligence relationship with the US is exceptionally close
and central to our national interest’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010a, p. 22).
Indeed, the UK participates in the deployment of the US nuclear security
architecture in Europe: it hosts one ballistic missile early warning station
and the European ground station for the Space-based Infrared System
(Stocker 2004, p. v). In early 2012, the Ministry of Defence signed a con-
tract with European missile manufacturer MBDA and charged it with
developing a new missile defence system for the Royal Navy (Guardian
2012; Richardson 2013); and in March 2013 it was announced that
Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers could join future missile interceptor
testing conducted by the US missile defence agency (Defense Update
2013).
For the UK’s participation in that effort to become consistent with
the notion of survivability as a feature of resilience, one has to assume
that the US will actually engage its anti-missile capabilities to inter-
cept a missile targeted at the UK, and with a high enough success rate
that increased UK survivability becomes possible. This consistency has
become conceivable because of the evolution of the stated goals of the
US missile defence system over the years.
From the peak of Reagan’s ambition to make nuclear weapons and the
ballistic missiles carrying them ‘impotent and obsolete’ (1983), by build-
ing a shield that the president even considered sharing with the whole
world,8 the ambitions of the project were diminished and its proponents
came to recognise a whole set of vulnerabilities. In other words, the
project, based on the logic of defence, became a way to enhance deter-
rence instead of replacing it (Rosenfeld 2009).9 Thus, the justification
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for the now-cancelled US deployment of the European phased adap-
tive approach for its missile defence programme consisted in enhancing
deterrence and ‘strengthen[ing] regional deterrence architectures’ rather
than replacing deterrence with defence (US Department of Defense
2010, pp. v, 12).10
All in all, there are two ways to make UK nuclear policy even par-
tially compatible with the criterion of maximum survivability, in spite
of the lack of a project to build protected space for the population. The
first would put its faith in the US mobilisation of its anti-missile capa-
bilities to protect the UK if it appears to be targeted by a large-scale
nuclear attack and to bet on a high enough rate of success to avoid the
total destruction of the British Isles. The second scenario is the gener-
ally unspoken case of a small-scale nuclear attack on the UK consistent
with the scale of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. In that case, the
assumption would be that the strike did not destroy all of the UK’s
nuclear means of retaliation and these could then be used in the hope
of restoring deterrence after its failure.
In a nutshell, the current UK nuclear weapons policy fails to meet the
two criteria of resilience – the recognition of the full scope of nuclear
risks and the goal of maximum survivability – and shows a lack of con-
sistency between the rhetoric of resilience and the practice of nuclear
weapons policy.
Conclusion: Deterrence against resilience?
As we have shown, the existing UK national interest discourse relat-
ing to nuclear weapons does not meet the requirements of a resilient
nuclear weapons policy. There is no recognition of the full spectrum
of nuclear vulnerability (that is, of the risk of accidental launch in the
UK or towards it) and nuclear weapons themselves do not guarantee
the survivability of the nation in case of a nuclear attack, except in a
case in which the enemy only launched a few warheads and is deterred
from launching the rest by the prospect of a retaliatory strike. The
systems which could have been invoked to limit damage have either
been abandoned, as in civil defence, or continue to be supported but
as instruments of deterrence rather than defence, for example, US bal-
listic missile defence and the now-cancelled European phased adaptive
approach. Finally, a lot of very optimistic assumptions about the effi-
cacy of the missile defence system and the commitment of the US as an
ally are needed in order for these systems to be a meaningful part of a
nuclear security infrastructure closer to the imperatives of resilience.
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Perhaps, then, some academics and public intellectuals have been
too quick to radicalise the opposition between security and resilience
and to talk/write as if a turn from the first to the second is actually
occurring in defining the UK national interest. More than that, if such
a shift is not taking place regarding the weapon system presented as
the ‘ultimate’ security guarantee of the country, one might question
what the whole idea of such a turn from security to resilience actually
means.
Given that the lack of consistency between the rhetoric of resilience
and policy practice comes from an incomplete recognition of the expo-
sure to danger which is created or accepted by this policy, the idea that
resilience is a public good appears problematic on both of the grounds
we defined in the introduction:
• the consistency between the discourse of resilience and the actual
policy put in place in the name of the national interest; and
• the public’s acceptance of exposures to dangers and their justifica-
tion.
This argument also holds if policymakers did discuss nuclear weapons
accidents, but did so in secret, because the unjustified exposure to dan-
ger remains. Furthermore, this lack of consistency and the failure to
recognise the risk of nuclear weapons accidents distorts the construc-
tion of the UK national interest regarding nuclear weapons. It privileges
a pro-nuclear weapons position by removing the possibility of nuclear
accident from public discussion (see, for example, Pelopidas 2011).
Ultimately, the current public discourse on deterrence remains an
obstacle to the shift to resilience as a recognition of vulnerability
because, as a communicative practice, it has two audiences with appar-
ently contradictory expectations (Pelopidas 2013c). On the one hand,
the adversary has to be convinced of the credibility of the retaliatory
strike for a deterrent threat to make sense. If he doubts the resolve of
the domestic leader, convincing him requires communicating that the
situation might spiral out of control so that the retaliatory strike will
take place even if the leader is not resolute enough to order it (Schelling
1960, chap. 6; 1966, chap. 3). This is exactly what current policymak-
ers think domestic audiences do not want to hear. Therefore, even in
contemporary democracies, populations are not consulted about which
cause(s) would justify their exposure to nuclear disaster, so one cannot
know what their answer would be. As a result, the imperatives of public
acceptability of the discourse of deterrence as understood by political
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elites prevent the conditions of a shift towards resilience, which would
at least publicly recognise the condition of global nuclear vulnerability.
Notes
1. After all, there are many systems that one might not wish to make resilient,
including antibiotic-resistant bacteria, dictatorships, the global banking and
bonus system, slavery and neo-liberalism, see Limnios et al. (2012).
2. The peer-reviewed journal Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Dis-
courses takes this approach as its manifesto, see also Evans and Reid (2013,
2014) and Neocleous (2013).
3. In the UK National Security Strategy the term ‘risk’ appears much more fre-
quently than does ‘threat’: risk and risks appear 478 times, while threat and
threats appear only 69 times. The UK also established a National Risk Register
(UK Cabinet Office 2012).
4. Following a visit to one of the Royal Navy’s Vanguard-class submarines in
Scotland, David Cameron reasserted that: ‘having that nuclear deterrent is,
quite simply, the best insurance policy you can have that you will never be
subject to nuclear blackmail’ (Cameron 2013).
5. For an elaboration of this idea and the notion of ‘epistemic accident’, see
Downer (2011). He defines epistemic accidents as ‘an emergent property, a
fundamental consequence, of the structure of engineering knowledge. They
can be defined as those accidents that occur because a scientific or technolog-
ical assumption proves to be erroneous, even though there were reasonable
and logical reasons to hold that assumption before (although not after) the
event.’ Most importantly for our argument, he adds that ‘Epistemic acci-
dents . . . are unavoidable because engineers necessarily build technologies
around fallible theories, judgments, and assumptions’ (p. 752).
6. In agreement with the Russian federation, the US has reprogrammed its mis-
siles so that in case of unauthorised launch, they would head towards the
ocean. We could not find evidence of such an attempt from other nuclear-
weapon states (Schlosser 2013b, p. 478; Feaver and Thompson Sharp 2010,
p. 45).
7. Lord Des Browne of Ladyton confirmed to one of the authors that this was
not discussed when he was UK secretary of state for defence (interview with
Des Browne, London, 16 October 2013). This is all the more surprising as
the risks of accidents at nuclear power plants are recognised in the National
Risk Assessment and in the 2013 National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies
(UK Cabinet Office 2013c, p. 34).
8. Reagan voiced this idea in a meeting in the situation room on 3 February
1986 (Hoffmann 2009, pp. 240–241).
9. The shift from defending to strengthening deterrence as the key rationale
for the US ballistic missile defence programme has been all the clearer since
the US Congress passed the National Missile Defence project in 1999 with
its focus becoming regional threats with a very specific emphasis on Iran
and North Korea instead of any possible ballistic missile threat (Rosenfeld
2009, p. 205; US Department of Defense 2010, pp. iii, iv, 13). The focus on
strengthening deterrence and not strictly protecting a territory is common to
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all current missile defence programmes including the most ambitious ones
in the US and Israel, in spite of money invested in the US ballistic missile
defence programme and the Israeli Iron Dome, and the claims of supporters
of the missile defence programmes. The French president, Jacques Chirac,
expressed this very clearly on 19 July 2006 when he contemplated the par-
ticipation of France in reflections about missile defence (see Kelleher et al.
2013).
10. For an overview of the phased adaptive approach as outlined by Barack
Obama in September 2009 and updates on its implementation, see Arms
Control Association (2013).
